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Abstract: Political parties are crucial for democratic politics; thus, the growing 
incidence of party and party system failure raises questions about the health of 
representative democracy the world over. This article examines the collapse of 
the Venezuelan party system, arguably one of the most institutionalized party 
systems in Latin America, by examining the individual-level basis behind the 
exodus of partisans from the traditional parties. Multinomial logit analysis of 
partisan identification in 1998, the pivotal moment of the system’s complete col-
lapse, indicates that people left the old system and began to support new parties 
because the traditional parties failed to incorporate and give voice to important 
ideas and interests in society while viable alternatives emerged to fill this void 
in representation.
 A central aspect of democracy is that citizens have a voice in decision 
making and influence government so that it is continually responsive to 
their preferences (Dahl 1971). In contemporary democracies, much of this 
representation occurs through the channels of political parties. Parties 
are the primary agents of representation and virtually the only actors 
with access to elected positions (Hagopian 1998). By channeling the pur-
suit of interests into the institutional structure, parties peacefully frame 
* A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, August 2003. Thanks to Evelyne Huber, Nathan Kelly, and 
Scott Mainwaring as well as the anonymous LARR reviewers for their helpful comments. 
Additionally, I recognize the contributions of José Vicente Carrasquero and Adolfo Vargas 
of the Universidad Simón Bolívar for providing access to RedPol98 as well as those of 
Félix Seijas of IVAD (Instituto Venezolano de Análisis de Datos), Luis Christiansen and 
Roberto Zapata of Consultores 21, Mario Acuña and Edmond Saade of DATOS, and Diane 
Ramsey of the University of North Carolina’s Odum Institute for providing access to the 
data used in constructing the partisan identification series. Funding for this research was 
provided by the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad program, the Pew 
Foundation, the Graduate School and the University Center for International Studies at 
the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, and a Professional Development Award 
from the University of Tennessee. Of course, I am ultimately responsible for the analysis 
and interpretations presented here. 
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1. System transformations include changes in the number of parties or in the level of 
ideological polarization; shifting from a two-party system to a multiparty one is trans-
formation, but change within the same multiparty system structure is not. Discontinuity 
in the number of parties or polarization indicates the existing system has been replaced 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995).
competitive politics and allow different interests to participate and gain 
access to the governing process through democratic means (Przeworski 
1995). In countries where democracy itself remains tenuous, the nature 
of the party system may promote or impede democratic consolidation, 
thereby impacting both governance and governability.
 Significant changes in a party system’s structure and major components, 
then, will profoundly impact political dynamics and the quality and endur-
ance of democracy. This sort of change, which extends beyond the context 
of a stable system and involves transformation of the system itself, shapes 
the nature of contestation and the policy outcomes the system produces. 
Party system collapse is a particularly troubling sort of transformation, 
involving both transformation of the system and virtual elimination of 
its component parties. Party system disintegration is likely to lead, at 
least initially, to disorder and heightened conflict in politics. Civil society 
organizations and nascent political parties that fill the vacuum created by 
collapse may elevate conflict and produce uneven political contestation. In 
essence, the decay and failure of parties and party systems elicit concern 
about the quality of representative democracy. 
 A wealth of literature on party system structure (Cox 1997; Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967) and internal party dynamics (Levitsky 2003) exists, and 
important advances have been made in understanding the fortunes of 
certain types of parties (Kitschelt 1994). Realignment and dealignment 
research even addresses some issues concerning changes in party systems 
(Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984). But these studies concern fluctuations 
within the context of a stable party system where the number of parties 
and their relative ideological positions remain constant. Neither the re-
alignment literature nor studies of party systems’ internal structures and 
component parties directly examine the sort of change that “occurs when 
a party system is transformed from one class or type of party system into 
another” (Mair 1997, 52).1 Few studies consider this sort of system-trans-
forming change (but see Mair 1997). Moreover, research that does explore 
system transformation tends to focus on the systemic outcome of decline 
without exploring its foundation in individual political behavior (Dietz 
and Myers 2003). What remains a mystery is which citizens are more likely 
to abandon old political parties in favor of emerging alternatives. 
 I narrow this gap in understanding by exploring the microlevel un-
derpinnings of party system transformation through analysis of partisan-
ship at the pivotal point when an old system is replaced with a new one. 
Such analysis provides insight into the differences between citizens who 
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remain true to traditional parties and those who do not, illuminating fac-
tors that enable abandonment of the old system and encourage support 
for emerging parties. Understanding what motivates people to desert 
existing parties in favor of new groups provides leverage in explaining 
the underlying basis for party system transformation.
the unexPected coLLaPse of VenezueLa’s Party systeM
 To explore the individual-level dynamics of party system transforma-
tion, this article examines collapse, the particularly problematic form of 
transformation that has become increasingly common in Latin America. I 
analyze the dramatic decay of Venezuela’s party system, in which the two 
major parties disintegrated and were supplanted by new parties constitut-
ing a polarized multiparty system. The collapse of the Venezuelan party 
system offers an ideal opportunity for exploring system transformation. 
From the onset of the current democratic period until the 1980s, Venezuela 
was considered an example of democratic success, holding regular competi-
tive elections, guaranteeing civil and political rights, and alternating control 
of government between two institutionalized, mass parties (Coppedge 
1994). And these parties, Acción Democrática (AD) and the Christian 
Democratic Party (COPEI), were instrumental in the development and 
endurance of Venezuelan democracy (Kornblith and Levine 1995). 
 Institutionalized party systems like Venezuela’s have been considered 
crucial for democratic consolidation because they provide advantages 
such as stability, governability, and accountability (Dix 1992; Mainwar-
ing and Scully 1995). But despite what appeared to be a high degree of 
institutionalization, the party system began to decay in the 1980s. Some 
scholars had observed cracks in the system and expected change or slow 
decay (Martz and Myers 1986), but its complete collapse was largely 
unanticipated. Nevertheless, the two-and-a-half-party system and its 
major component parties have all but disappeared in the past decade. 
Venezuela, then, presents an instance where party system disintegration 
seemed a highly improbable outcome, but where the system, neverthe-
less, decayed dramatically. 
 To assess how this seemingly exemplary party system came to such an 
inauspicious end, I analyze Venezuelans’ underlying attitudes during the 
collapse. I begin with a description of the evolution of the party system 
since the 1970s, discussing changes in aggregate partisanship. Then, using a 
nationwide survey conducted at the critical moment of collapse, I examine 
the differences between people who remained loyal to Venezuela’s tradi-
tional parties and those who abandoned them for new options. I conclude 
by arguing that key determinants of party system collapse were the failure 
of existing parties to incorporate important ideas and interests in society as 
well as the emergence of viable alternatives that seemed to fill this void.
PartisanshiP during the coLLaPse of VenezueLa’s Party systeM    81
PartisanshiP in a changing systeM
 Because a party should function to represent its base, a party that lacks 
sympathizers and militants lacks purpose and power. So, shifts in partisan-
ship tell a story of the ebb and flow of parties within a system and of how 
the system changes as a result. To explore the evolution of the Venezuelan 
party system, I examine aggregate partisanship over 30 years beginning 
with the 1973 consolidation of the two-party system, followed by the 
system’s decay and the emergence of new parties. Figure 1 depicts parti-
sanship in Venezuela from 1973 through 2003, based on data assembled 
from dozens of nationwide, face-to-face, public opinion surveys.2
 In figure 1, we can see that AD, COPEI, and the traditional left main-
tained fairly constant levels of support through the mid-1980s. However, 
2. Data are taken from Baloyra, Batoba, Consultores 21, DATOS, and IVAD. The typi-
cal question battery includes militants and sympathizers as partisans; only respondents 
indicating neither party militancy nor sympathy are considered independents. The data 
are three-year moving averages of the annual partisanship series, constructed by averag-
ing all surveys in a given year. In some years (1974, 1976–8) no surveys were conducted; 
I fill these gaps by averaging adjacent years’ frequencies. No company provides coverage 
of the entire period, but in years where overlap exists, frequencies track well together, 
indicating cross-firm reliability. 
Figure 1 Partisan Identification in the New and Old Party Systems, 1973–2003. 
Note: Data displayed are a smoothed version of the annual average frequency of survey re-
spondents who identified with each group. The Old Left includes Movimiento al Socialismo 
(MAS), Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo (MEP), Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria 
(MIR), and Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV). The New Right includes Convergencia, 
IRENE, Proyecto Venezuela, Primero Justicia, and Gente de Petroleo. The New Left includes 
La Causa R, Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) and Patria Para Todos. Sources: Baloyra, 
Batoba, Consultores 21, DATOS, and IVAD; compiled by the author.
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identification with parties of the old system decayed by the end of the 
decade. AD support fell precipitously after the reelection of AD’s Carlos 
Andrés Pérez in 1988. The timing of this decline is significant, as it oc-
curred simultaneously with Pérez’s abandonment of the state-centered 
development model for which he had become famous during his first 
presidential term. In early 1989, Pérez announced widely unpopular 
reforms that embraced many orthodox neoliberal policies including 
privatization, trade liberalization, and deregulation (Naím 1993). In 
February 1989, concerns about an increase in transportation fares pro-
voked many Venezuelans to engage in a largely spontaneous protest, 
el Caracazo, which lasted for several days and ended only when Pérez 
called upon the military to stop the violence. Despite the unrest, Pérez 
proceeded with implementation of many aspects of his agenda, albeit 
in a scaled-back form (Karl 1997; Naím 1993). The announcement of 
neoliberal reforms and subsequent protests accelerated AD’s demise, 
in part because the reforms marked a significant rightward shift by the 
leader of a historically center-left party and because the protests furnished 
a stunning, public display of festering frustration with the traditional 
parties (Author interviews 60, 66).3 
 Neither COPEI nor the old left were able to capitalize on this wide-
spread rejection of AD. The old left decayed slowly beginning in the 
late 1980s. And COPEI’s decline was remarkable, starting in the early 
1990s and intensifying when former president Rafael Caldera aban-
doned COPEI and won reelection as an independent in 1993. In part, 
COPEI’s rapid decline may be attributed to Caldera leaving the party 
and then successfully striving to undermine the party organization 
he had played an instrumental role in building (Author interview 62). 
But the copeyano party leadership also contributed to the feud between 
Caldera and his former party by pushing the past president to the pe-
riphery of the party and working to undermine his ability to win the 
COPEI nomination for the presidency in the 1993 elections (Author 
interview 66). Together these dynamics served to divide and damage 
the credibility of the Venezuelan Christian Democratic movement, 
which weakened the viability of COPEI as the major alternative to 
AD (Author interviews 57 and 58).4 The decline of these fundamental 
components of Venezuela’s old party system was so great that by 2000, 
AD support fell below 10 percent and support for COPEI and the old 
left each dropped below 5 percent. By 2003, fewer than 15 percent of 
Venezuelans identified with AD or COPEI.
3. The author conducted nearly 90 open-ended interviews with current and former 
Venezuelan party leaders and politicians during 2003 and 2006.
4. Thanks to the anonymous LARR reviewer who suggested the complexities of this 
dynamic.
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 As affiliation with the old system declined, political independence 
grew, reaching 40 percent by 1991. Then just as the number of inde-
pendents leveled out, support for new political options developed. The 
new left appears with the rise of the radical union-based La Causa R in 
the late 1980s. The new right emerges when former president Caldera 
leaves COPEI and creates Convergencia to support his 1993 presidential 
bid. In 1998, more parties emerge to contest the presidential elections, 
including Salas Romer’s Proyecto Venezuela and Chávez’s Movimiento 
Quinta República (MVR), and new parties overtook the old in their share 
of partisan identifiers. Parties of the old system lost most of their sup-
porters during the 1990s, with people becoming independents and then 
defecting to emerging options of the left and right. At the system level, 
this created a shift from a predictable two-and-a-half-party system to a 
polarized multiparty system.
exPLaining PartisanshiP during Party systeM coLLaPse
 By the 1990s the decay of the old parties extended beyond the ebb and 
flow typical of election cycles. This decay first manifested as dealignment 
in which Venezuelans simply had no partisan sympathies, rather than as 
complete system collapse in which people left the old parties and also 
embraced new affiliations. AD and COPEI continued to receive a plural-
ity of votes in legislative contests, and when the old left was included, 
old parties controlled 66 percent of seats in the Chamber of Deputies 
and 70 percent of the Senate through 1998.5 Furthermore, although the 
traditional parties technically did not control the presidency beginning 
in 1994, Rafael Caldera’s reelection can hardly be considered a significant 
break with the old parties. In leaving COPEI, Caldera painted himself as 
an independent, but his ties to the old system were undeniable. Alone, 
Caldera’s election was not sufficient to constitute the collapse of the party 
system, although his departure from COPEI did play a significant part 
in delegitimizing one of the system’s major component parties.
 Therefore, although the party system clearly decayed throughout 
the 1990s, its collapse was not complete until the 1998 elections. In 
the year leading up to the elections, we observe not only declining 
support for the old system, but also rapidly increasing affiliation with 
new parties. The 1998 elections proved pivotal. In the legislative elec-
tions of November 8, AD and COPEI received only 37 percent of the 
vote, and presidential elections a month later solidified the collapse. 
AD and COPEI abandoned their parties’ presidential nominees and 
instead supported former copeyano and Proyecto Venezuela founder 
Henrique Salas Romer. Together the parties attracted only 11 percent 
5. Compiled from Consejo Supremo/Nacional Electoral. 
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of the presidential vote—less than one-third of Salas Romer’s total 
support, and Salas was soundly beaten by former coup leader Hugo 
Chávez. So, although decline is evident during the 1990s, the 1998 
elections represent the pivotal moment in which the old parties’ decay 
ultimately produced the collapse of the entire system, when the old 
system’s major components no longer controlled the government and 
were supplanted by new options.
 In the dramatic transformation of Venezuela’s once-exemplary party 
system, 1998 is critical as the moment in which decay becomes collapse. 
By analyzing partisanship at this pivotal moment, I am able to examine 
how individual-level attitudes and actions produced system collapse. 
The analysis employs data from a nationwide, face-to-face, survey of 
1,500 Venezuelans, conducted November 13–27, 1998, after the legislative 
elections that dealt a heavy blow to AD and COPEI and before the victory 
of Chávez in the December presidential contest. The survey, RedPol98, 
was designed by a network of Venezuelan scholars and conducted by 
the respected firm DATOS, I.R. Using these data, I explain partisanship, 
providing insight into the motivations of the many Venezuelans who left 
the old parties and embraced new options. 
theorizing PartisanshiP in a changing systeM
 What prompted so many Venezuelans to abandon the old parties 
while others maintained long-standing partisan ties? To answer this 
question, I develop hypotheses based on the particular circumstances 
of party system transformation and on general theories of partisanship. 
I argue that the critical impetus behind the exodus from the traditional 
party system was its failure to provide adequate substantive and sym-
bolic representation to growing sectors of society. Lack of meaningful 
distinctions between the major parties provoked disenchantment with 
existing parties and encouraged the pursuit of new options that ad-
dressed shortcomings within the system. Also, the absence of a sense 
of connectedness to the parties enabled people to stray because they 
were not integrated into the existing system. Ultimately, frustration 
with the choices presented by the old system fomented a desire to look 
elsewhere for representation.
 People sympathize with parties that hold positions similar to their 
own and search for meaningful ideological and policy options that re-
flect their priorities (Franklin and Jackson 1983; Shanks and Miller 1990). 
Given the disarray of the Venezuelan party system in the late 1990s, ac-
curately identifying the ideology and issue positions of political parties, 
especially new entrants, was difficult. But, it was increasingly clear that 
AD and COPEI no longer presented Venezuelans with distinct choices. 
In a nationwide survey conducted in 1983, respondents placed AD 
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significantly to the left of COPEI,6 but in the 1998 RedPol survey differ-
ences in the ideological placements of the two parties had disappeared. 
As one party leader noted, “in the end, AD and COPEI were exactly the 
same” (Author interview 35). Furthermore, the policies implemented 
by adeco Carlos Andrés Pérez marked a notable shift away from his 
historically center-left party, with movement away from statism and 
interventionism towards more free market policies. COPEI, led by its 
former presidential candidate and Secretary General Eduardo Fernández, 
also advocated a neoliberal approach in the 1990s. So, while the new 
parties’ positions were uncertain, voters knew that AD and COPEI did 
not provide meaningful alternatives and that the two parties were right 
of the average Venezuelan. Frustration with the parties’ indistinguish-
able positions likely prompted Venezuelans, especially those on the left, 
to look outside the old system for parties that might speak for them. 
Therefore, ideology and issue positions will be significant factors in the 
decision to abandon the old parties. 
 Lack of institutionalized connectedness to the traditional parties also 
likely prompted people to look beyond the old system to the ranks of 
new parties. AD and COPEI were hierarchical organizations in which 
certain established interests, especially business and labor, were well 
represented and given privileged status (Crisp 2000; Martz 1966). Labor 
union and professional association members were therefore integrated 
into the party system and able to find effective avenues for their voices 
to be heard. But people outside these established functional groups, 
such as the urban poor and informal workers, did not have a formal 
connection to the old parties. Virtually all former AD and COPEI party 
leaders interviewed acknowledged this lack of attention to the informal 
sector. As one former member of AD’s CEN (Comité Ejecutivo Nacional) 
acknowledged, “there was never any discussion about the informal 
sector; the party was completely unprepared and did not try to include 
new people or new groups” (Author interview 49). This absence of rep-
resentation was exacerbated as the formal and public sectors declined in 
the 1990s and were replaced by the informal sector and unemployment 
(ILO 1998). I hypothesize that by 1998 the growing number of people 
who lacked institutionalized ties to political parties through work-based 
associations felt disconnected from and unrepresented by the old system 
and therefore turned to other parties that might speak more effectively 
for their interests.
 General discontent with political parties’ failure to serve as effective 
and trustworthy channels of representation probably also drove people 
away from the traditional system. I anticipate that distrust of political 
6. The 1983 Batoba survey was provided by the USB Banco de Datos Pobla-
cionales, N=1789.
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parties and negative evaluations of the parties’ motivations will cause 
people to become independents. It is even possible that as new parties 
emerge and offer alternative expressions of what it means to be a politi-
cal party, disenchanted respondents may embrace these groups. Taken 
together then, lack of ideological and issue representation, absence of 
incorporation into the old parties, and general frustration with parties 
are likely to make people disappointed with their lack of voice and in-
fluence in the party system. This disappointment will provoke people 
to exit the old system and turn elsewhere for representation.
 Research on partisanship has also found political and economic evalu-
ations to have important influences on partisan sympathies (Fiorina 1981; 
MacKuen, Erickson, and Stimson 1989; Kelly 2003). Positive assessments 
of presidential performance are expected to promote identification with 
the incumbent’s party. So, people satisfied with outgoing President Cal-
dera should have been inclined to affiliate with parties connected to him. 
Caldera’s coalition included parties of the new right (Convergencia) and 
the old party system (Moviemiento al Socialismo [MAS]), and he continued 
to be associated in many people’s minds with the traditional party system 
despite his repeated efforts to undermine it (Author interviews 39 and 46). 
People pleased with Caldera’s performance were most likely affiliated with 
the new right or perhaps the traditional parties, while the dissatisfied were 
inclined to consider other options especially the new left. 
 With regard to economic assessments, negative retrospective evalua-
tions are expected to push people away from the old parties, while posi-
tive retrospective evaluations should promote loyalty to the old system.7 
Given the survey’s timing, prospective evaluations are expected to have 
the reverse effect. When RedPol98 was conducted, AD and COPEI had 
already lost their majority in Congress, and their sound defeat by Chávez 
in the upcoming presidential election was imminent. So, at this moment, 
the new left was the object of prospective assessments. Expectations that 
a new left government would perform better than the incumbent govern-
ment controlled by the old party system would have influenced people 
to sympathize with new left parties rather than remain committed to the 
traditional party system. So, frustration with the incumbent government 
likely promoted departure from the old parties while expectations of 
improved conditions under a government that excluded AD and COPEI 
could have influenced people to identify with new political options.
 Finally, I consider effects suggested by political socialization theories, 
which emphasize social characteristics (Miller and Shanks 1996) and early 
life experiences (Jennings and Niemi 1968) in generating long-standing 
partisan attachments. Given the recent fluidity of Venezuelan partisan 
7. Analysis only uses pocketbook evaluations because sociotropic evaluations 
were not available.
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identities, it is difficult to assume that Venezuelans developed strong 
ties to political parties as a result of early socialization. But it is possible 
that some experiences generated enduring bonds to the traditional party 
system, while others produced more malleable identities. People who 
grew up with or continue to be influenced by parents who are highly 
committed partisans are more likely to remain loyal to the old parties than 
people whose parents’ were not such firm supporters. The persistence 
of partisan identification may also be shaped by other influences on the 
duration and strength of commitment (Franklin and Jackson 1983). For 
instance, older respondents are likely to have developed stronger partisan 
ties than younger ones (Abramson 1975). Also, people who have fewer 
political resources or are less integrated into the party system, like the 
poor and uneducated, may be more inclined to abandon old partisan 
sympathies. And, despite the creation of women’s committees by both 
AD and COPEI, men have historically dominated Venezuela’s political 
arena; as a result, women are likely to be poorly integrated into the old 
system and have weaker partisan ties. 
anaLyzing PartisanshiP in VenezueLa
 I conduct multinomial logit analysis of RedPol98 respondents’ parti-
sanship to examine why Venezuelans identified with the new left or new 
right or became independents rather than maintaining sympathies for 
one of the old parties.8 Overall, 19 percent of respondents identified with 
a traditional party,9 35 percent with the new left, and 25 percent with the 
new right. Independents accounted for 21 percent of the sample. Based on 
the theoretical considerations outlined above, the analysis considers five 
sets of variables that should provide insight into the factors that influence 
party identification: ideology and issue positions, incorporation into the 
old party system, general attitudes about political parties, contemporary 
evaluations, and political socialization.10 Ideology is measured using 
respondents’ self-placement on a ten-point ideology scale where higher 
values are on the right. Issue positions assessed include attitudes toward 
decentralization, preferred economic system, state economic intervention, 
and privatization. The impact of general attitudes about political parties is 
assessed through two independent variables that ask whether parties are 
motivated purely by winning elections and whether political parties are 
8. Multinomial logit is appropriate because partisanship has four non-ordered 
categories. Old parties include: AD, COPEI, MAS. Treating MAS separately does 
not alter the findings. 
9. 15 percent adecos, 3 percent copeyanos, and 1 percent masistas (MAS sup-
porters).
10. Question wording and coding are available from the author upon re-
quest.
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trustworthy. Appraisals of the Caldera government as well as retrospec-
tive and prospective pocketbook economic evaluations tap perceptions 
of performance.11 Finally, father and mother’s partisan affiliations are 
included, as well as variables that account for the different socialization 
experiences that derive from education, age, class, and gender. 
 Results of this full model of partisanship are presented on the left side 
of table 1; traditional party supporters are the reference group. Positive 
coefficients indicate that higher values on the associated independent 
variable increase the probability of identifying with the nontraditional 
party grouping specified at the top of the column versus identifying with 
an old party. Overall, the model has considerable explanatory power; the 
partisanship of 55 percent of respondents is accurately predicted—over 
twice as high as the 25 percent that would be correct by random chance.12 
Right ideology has a statistically significant negative relationship for all 
categories of respondents who abandoned the old parties; but of the is-
sues, only decentralization has any measurable impact. Incorporation 
into the old parties served as a substantial impetus for loyalty to the old 
parties, while negative views of parties drove people away. Opinions of 
Caldera’s government are barely insignificant for members of the new 
left, while the effect of prospective evaluations is clearly significant for 
this group. Notably however, retrospective economic evaluations had no 
influence on the decision to exit the old system.13 This result is surprising 
in light of the consistent finding that economic problems have served 
to undermine support for incumbents in Venezuela and throughout the 
developing world (Kelly 2003, 2006; Pacek and Radcliff 1995; Remmer 
1991). However as Remmer (1991) is careful to point out, although crisis 
weakens incumbents, it does not generate support for radical alternatives. 
The finding here that at the moment of collapse, negative retrospective 
evaluations did not push people toward the drastic change embodied in 
Chávez, coincides with this caveat. Furthermore, given that the Caldera 
government, rather than the traditional parties, was likely to have been 
the object of retrospective evaluations at the moment of the survey, a dis-
connect between a respondent’s economic evaluations and the choice to 
maintain or abandon support for the traditional parties is understandable. 
11. It is possible that negative views of government performance as manifested 
in perceptions of corruption undermined support for the old system, but Red-
Pol98 does not provide any measures of corruption. The only item that comes 
close asks whether or not elections are clean. Models not shown included this 
variable, finding that views of election fraud had no effect on partisanship.
12. All the socialization variables but education have significant effects for at 
least one category of the dependent variable.
13. In models excluding prospective evaluations, retrospective evaluations 
remained insignificant.
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Poor retrospective evaluations at this moment were more likely to have 
diminished support for Caldera, rather than for AD and COPEI. 
 To simplify interpretation, I remove the insignificant issues and ret-
rospective evaluations from the final model presented in the right half 
of the table. The two models’ findings are parallel, and the restricted 
model does not sacrifice explanatory power, correctly predicting the 
partisanship of 49 percent of the sample. Because logit coefficients are 
substantively difficult to interpret, I also conduct a simulation to produce 
predicted probabilities based on this model.14 The discussion below refers 
to these probabilities of identifying with the different party groupings 
in order to illustrate the magnitude of each variable’s effect. 
 The analysis supports the argument that dissatisfaction with the rep-
resentation provided by the traditional parties prompted exodus from 
the old system. First, ideology has a significant and substantial impact on 
partisanship. Respondents who placed themselves on the left were more 
likely to abandon the traditional parties than those on the right were. As 
the relative size of the ideology coefficients indicate, respondents on the 
left are most likely to identify with the new left, but they are also more 
likely to support the new right or be independent than to remain loyal 
to a traditional party. Predicted probabilities suggest that being on the 
left produces a .62 probability of identifying with the new left, but only 
a .04 probability of identifying with a traditional party. Respondents on 
the left are also more likely to identify with the new right or be indepen-
dents than to identify with a traditional party, having a .17 probability 
of belonging to each of these non-traditional groupings.15 
 Alternatively, people on the right seemed more satisfied with the 
options that the old parties presented. Shifting from the left end of the 
ideological spectrum to the right significantly increases the probability 
of a respondent identifying with a traditional party. Those on the right 
have a .28 probability of remaining loyal to the old system, while people 
on the left have only a .04 probability. If those on the right did turn away 
from the traditional party system, they were most inclined to support 
the new right, with a .42 probability. New right parties consisted largely 
of splinter groups from AD and COPEI and as such did not represent a 
14. Simulation conducted using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). To 
calculate the probabilities, I set each variable to its appropriate measure of central 
tendency. Education, age, and ideology set to their means. Class, decentralization, 
and only care about elections set to their medians. All others set to their modes. 
Then each variable’s value is alternately set to a low and a high value to determine 
the probability of supporting each party grouping at these different values. A 
complete table reporting simulated predicted probabilities for all independent 
variables in the model is available from the author upon request.
15. Independents were equally distributed across the ideological spectrum.
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Table 1 Multinomial Logit Analysis of Partisan Identification, 19981
Full Model Restricted Model
Independent Variables
New 
Left
New 
Right Ind.
New 
Left
New 
Right Ind.
Ideology
Right Ideology -.36** -.11** -.20** -.38** -.12** -.21**
(.04) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.05)
Issue Positions
Decentralization .19 .32 .44* .13 .33* .34*
(.17) (.17) (.20) (.15) (.16) (.17)
Economic System2
  Capitalism .19 .31 .18
(.51) (.52) (.62)
  Socialism .50 .48 .44
(.52) (.54) (.63)
State Intervention3
  More Intervention .32 .14 -.21
(.31) (.31) (.35)
  Less Intervention .54 .43 .45
(.52) (.52) (.56)
Privatization4
  Privatize All .32 .15 .16
(.38) (.38) (.43)
  Privatize None .15 -.14 .21
(.24) (.24) (.27)
Incorporation
Affiliation with Classic  
  Constituency of Old Parties
-.55* 
(.28)
-.78** 
(.29)
-.72* 
(.34)
-.55* 
(.27)
-.75** 
(.28)
-.78* 
(.32)
Attitudes about Parties
Only Care about Elections .43** .37* 1.06** .42** .40** .70**
(.16) (.16) (.26) (.15) (.15) (.05)
Trust in Parties
  A Lot of Trust -.97* -1.06* -1.00 -.86* -.84* -1.04
(.44) (.45) (.68) (.44) (.42) (.66)
  No Trust .74** .50* 1.15** .68** .45* 1.09**
(.23) (.22) (.27) (.21) (.21) (.24)
Contemporary Evaluations
Caldera’s Performance -.44 -.04 -.16 -.53* .05 -.23
(.24) (.23) (.28) (.23) (.21) (.25)
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Full Model Restricted Model
Independent Variables
New 
Left
New 
Right Ind.
New 
Left
New 
Right Ind.
Retrospective Economic  
  Evaluations
   My situation has improved -.08 .44 -.49
(.30) (.28) (.36)
   My situation has worsened .43 .18 .03
(.26) (.27) (.29)
Prospective Economic  
Evaluations
   My situation will improve .64** .28 .10 .58** .34 .13
(.23) (.23) (.28) (.22) (.22) (.25)
   My situation will worsen -.53 -.28 .18 -.34 -.21 .28
(.35) (.35) (.37) (.32) (.32) (.33)
Socialization
Father Favors Traditional 
  Party
-1.23** 
(.30)
-1.01** 
(.30)
-.92** 
(.34)
-1.17** 
(.27)
-.97** 
(.28)
-1.02** 
(.31)
Mother Favors Traditional 
  Party
-.37 
(.30)
-.26 
(.30)
-.88** 
(.34)
-.35 
(.27)
-.24 
(.28)
-.74* 
(.30)
Education .06 .02 .13 .05 .04 .11
(.11) (.11) (.13) (.10) (.11) (.12)
Age -.04 -.28** .001 .02 -.24** .01
(.08) (.08) (.09) (.07) (.08) (.08)
Class .05 .35* .22 .08 .39** .30
(.16) (.15) (.17) (.15) (.14) (.16)
Male -.16 -.54* -.03 .02 -.42* .04
(.22) (.22) (.25) (.20) (.20) (.23)
Constant 1.99* .45 -1.07 2.77** .62 -.38
(.89) (.92) (1.06) (.65) (.68) (.76)
Log-Likelihood -1069.4 -1238.8
Likelihood Ratio Test (d.f.) 1735.6 (69) ** 1396.8 (45) **
Correct Predictions 55% 49%
N 953 1079
1. Dependent Variable Reference Category: Supporters of the Old Parties—AD, COPEI, 
and MAS 
2. Reference: Communism
3. Reference: The same amount of state intervention 
4. Reference: Privatize some state industries
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01. Analysis conducted with 
Stata 9.0.
Source: RedPol98, Universidad Simón Bolívar Banco de Datos Poblacionales
Table 1 continued
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radical change. Therefore, while people on the left seemed to seek a clear 
break with the old system and embraced radical new left parties, people 
on the right were less likely to desire fundamental transformation of the 
party system, supporting either new right or traditional parties. 
 Notably, the analysis indicates that people on the left were extremely 
dissatisfied with the traditional parties. Not only were they more likely 
to become independents or support the new left over the traditional par-
ties—a number of people on the left even preferred the new right over 
the old system. This tendency supports the hypothesis that people on the 
left were especially frustrated with AD and COPEI’s failure to provide 
meaningful policy alternatives and resented the shift toward the right 
that occurred within sectors of AD during the 1990s. This frustration 
drove people of the left almost completely out of the old party system.
 Evidence concerning the impact of issue positions on partisanship is 
more ambiguous. Respondents favoring decentralization were much more 
likely to identify with the new right or be independents than to remain loyal 
to the traditional parties. The predicted probabilities indicate that oppos-
ing decentralization increased the probability of supporting a traditional 
party by 10 points from .12 to .22. Conversely, favoring decentralization 
inclined respondents toward the new right or independence. 
 Contrary to expectations, however, the other issues had no significant 
effects and were dropped from the final model. Perhaps this result should 
not be entirely surprising. In retrospect, identifying the policy positions 
of Venezuela’s new parties does not seem problematic. New left parties 
support socialism and state intervention and oppose decentralization and 
privatization; new right parties maintain the opposite positions, favoring 
capitalism, decentralization, privatization, and less state intervention. But 
in 1998, as many new parties were just emerging, citizens faced consid-
erable information barriers and doubt about parties’ stances on specific 
issues. While some new parties had experience in regional governments, 
most lacked national-level records. In light of the instability both within 
parties and in the party system as a whole at the moment of the survey, 
finding a null result is not astonishing. In fact, the turmoil and ambiguity of 
the political situation amplify the importance of left ideology and support 
for decentralization in generating the frustrating absence of substantive 
representation that drove people from the old party system. 
 The analysis also finds that lack of incorporation into the traditional 
party system induced departure from the traditional parties. I hypoth-
esized that institutionalized connections with the traditional parties 
served to integrate people into the old system and promoted effective 
representation of their interests within government, while the absence 
of such connections generated resentment concerning the old parties’ 
failure to voice concerns outside the formal system of interest repre-
sentation. Indeed, I find that Venezuelans who were part of the classic 
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constituency of the old parties were much less likely to abandon the 
traditional system and embrace new options than those who were not 
incorporated. Membership in a labor union or professional association 
increased respondents’ probability of remaining loyal to the old parties 
by 11 points from .15 to .26, while nonmembers were significantly more 
likely to abandon the old parties in favor of something new.
 General disenchantment with political parties also prompted depar-
ture from the traditional system. As table 1 makes clear, frustration with 
what was perceived as parties’ singular electoral motivation pushed 
people away from the old system. People who felt parties only cared 
about elections were less likely to belong to a traditional party and 
more likely to be independents or support a new party. Predicted prob-
abilities indicate that Venezuelans who thought parties were motivated 
only by elections were half as likely to support a traditional party as 
those who did not hold this view. In contrast, the probability of being 
an independent was .20 for those who thought parties were focused 
simply on elections, but only .11 for those who viewed parties’ motiva-
tions more favorably. Trust in parties, another measure of general views 
about political parties, has a similar relationship with partisanship. High 
trust promoted loyalty to the traditional parties, while lack of trust pro-
voked exit. Respondents with a lot of trust had a 29 percent chance of 
sympathizing with a traditional party, whereas those who did not trust 
parties only had a 15 percent chance of remaining within the old system. 
Venezuelans without trust in parties were more inclined to belong to any 
of the new political options—left, right, or independent—than affiliate 
with the traditional parties. 
 The contemporary evaluation variables suggest additional motiva-
tions behind many Venezuelans’ departure from the traditional parties. 
Assessments of the incumbent government and prospective economic 
evaluations have notable effects on partisanship, particularly in dis-
tinguishing between old parties and the new left. Negative views of 
Caldera’s performance motivated identification with the new left over 
the traditional parties and the new right. Predicted probabilities dem-
onstrate that negative evaluations of Caldera produced an increase of 
10 points in the probability of supporting the new left. Alternatively, 
positive evaluations of Caldera increased the likelihood of backing the 
new right by 8 points. Prospective economic evaluations also contributed 
significantly to some respondents’ decisions to abandon the old system 
and embrace the new left. Belief that the economy would improve in the 
next six months under a new left government led many respondents to 
embrace these parties. As expected, people who anticipated economic 
improvement under the newly elected government led by Chávez and 
MVR were significantly more likely to identify with the new left. Posi-
tive prospective evaluations increased the probability of identifying with 
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the new left by 8 points, but decreased the probability of supporting a 
traditional party by 5 points. As mentioned above, retrospective evalu-
ations had no significant influence on partisan identification and were 
therefore, excluded from this analysis. 
 Finally, the analysis indicates that despite the fluidity of Venezuelan 
partisan identities during the 1990s, political socialization shaped re-
spondents’ decisions to remain loyal to or abandon the traditional par-
ties. Fathers who supported traditional parties significantly increased 
loyalty in their children. Mothers’ identification with a traditional party 
made respondents less likely to become independents; effects for the 
new left and the new right, while not significant, are also in the expected 
direction. Clearly, parents’ devotion to the old parties promoted similar 
commitment among their children. We also find that younger people 
and women were more likely to join the new right than to maintain ties 
to one of the old parties, supporting the hypothesis that people such as 
women and youth whose socialization experiences produced weaker ties 
to the traditional parties were likely to leave the old system. However, 
contrary to these expectations, upper-class people were also more likely 
to join the new right than those of lower status. There are no significant 
socio-demographic distinctions between the traditional parties and the 
new left and independents. So, the unique socialization experiences of 
young people, women, and the wealthy prompted them to join the new 
right, but socialization did not contribute to departure from the tradi-
tional parties by new left supporters and independents. 
concLusions
 These findings provide considerable insight into the factors that moti-
vated so many Venezuelans to leave the old parties and embrace new ones 
during the late 1990s, a process which ultimately produced the collapse of 
the traditional party system in the 1998 elections. Analysis of partisanship 
at this pivotal moment reveals that abandonment of the old system was 
prompted by left ideology, lack of incorporation into traditional parties, 
negative views of parties, dissatisfaction with the incumbent, and expecta-
tions of better performance by new parties. And in some cases, the absence 
of socialization into the old system facilitated exit.
 Most significant in understanding the party system’s collapse is the 
myriad evidence suggesting that the mass exodus from the traditional 
system was motivated largely by people’s frustration with the system’s 
shortcomings in providing a sense of voice and influence in government. 
Findings concerning the effects of ideology and incorporation as well as 
general disenchantment with political parties emphasize the profound 
impact the system’s failure to listen to and speak for many Venezuelans 
had on their decision to leave the old parties. 
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 The analysis demonstrates that general disappointment with political 
parties pushed people away from the traditional parties toward new 
alternatives. But, more specific frustrations with the old system’s failure 
to speak for the ideas and interests of an increasingly significant portion 
of society proved to be a particularly critical catalyst behind the system’s 
collapse. Beginning in the late 1980s, the policies and ideological posi-
tions of AD and COPEI became increasingly interchangeable. Carlos 
Andrés Pérez’s support for and implementation of neoliberal policy 
reforms during the last adeco presidency marked a considerable shift to 
the right by this traditionally social-democratic party; and important 
factions within COPEI also supported these reforms. Furthermore, 
the support AD provided to its longtime rival during Caldera’s highly 
unpopular second administration likely served to further confuse and 
discourage voters. By the late 1990s, AD and COPEI no longer presented 
meaningful alternatives, as the two parties had converged upon a similar 
ideological position on the right side of the spectrum. This convergence 
produced frustration among people on the left who increasingly felt 
disenfranchised. When new parties emerged and became viable alterna-
tives, they attracted the growing numbers of people discontent with the 
indistinguishable policies of AD and COPEI. The analysis here expounds 
the individual-level underpinnings for this aggregate-level phenomenon; 
people on the right were seven times more likely to remain loyal to the 
traditional parties than those on the left.16 The failure of the traditional 
party system to give voice to both sides of the ideological spectrum drove 
people away from the old parties.
 In addition to AD and COPEI’s ideological uniformity undermining 
representation and prompting exit from the old system, formal means of 
channeling and voicing societal interests also proved inadequate. People 
connected to the traditional parties through membership in effectively 
incorporated sectoral groups like professional associations and unions 
were much more likely to remain committed to a traditional party than 
those who were not. By the late 1990s, the proportion of the population 
in these incorporated groups had dropped considerably. But the old 
parties failed to integrate emerging sectors into existing channels of 
interest representation; so, growing numbers of Venezuelans were not 
formally connected to the political system. This created a situation in 
which a large portion of the population lacked the attachments needed 
to promote commitment to the old system, making people more inclined 
to leave the traditional parties for new ones.
 What can these findings tell us more generally about the underpin-
nings of party system transformation and collapse? The failure of a party 
system to provide meaningful, viable alternatives promotes frustration 
16. For a discussion of the aggregate-level dynamics see Kelly (2005).
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among the portion of the population left unrepresented by the seemingly 
immutable agenda that will be implemented regardless of which party 
controls the government. This kind of frustration with what is viewed as 
the monolithic ideological position of the parties causes people who do 
not hold this same ideology to look elsewhere for representation. Lack 
of meaningful alternatives in a party system makes it more susceptible 
to transformation or collapse. Furthermore, a party system that does not 
adapt to changes in social and economic structure and neglects incor-
poration of emerging sectors of the population into existing channels of 
representation is also vulnerable to a mass exodus of partisans. As more 
people feel disconnected from and unrepresented by the existing parties, 
the system risks collapse—losing its position as the central mechanism 
connecting people to their government. Eventually, the hope that new 
political parties will perform better than the status quo provides the 
impetus for people not only to leave the old parties but also to embrace 
alternatives. In this analysis, we observed that positive expectations 
about the ability of a new left government to make improvements in 
the economy created the impetus for people to embrace the new left, 
the emerging dominance of which was crucial in the collapse of the old 
system. Therefore, this analysis suggests that party system collapse is 
precipitated by the inadequate representation of the old party system 
coupled with the anticipated success of new political alternatives.
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